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Abstract
This paper proposes a theory on information security. We argue that information security is
imperfectly understood and aim to bring about an altered understanding of why efforts are made to
engage in information security. The goal of information security is widely recognised as the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information however we argue that the goal is actually to
simply create resources. This paper responds to calls for more theory in information systems, places
the discussion in philosophical context and compares various definitions. It then identifies the key
concepts of information security, describes the relationships between these concepts, as well as scope
and causal explanations. The paper provides the theoretical base for understanding why information is
protected, in addition to theoretical and practical implications and suggestions for future research.
Keywords
Information security, resources, controls, threats, theory development.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Despite the concept of information security being very well established, the reasons and motivations
behind it are imperfectly understood. This paper seeks to explain how and why the phenomena that
comprise the concepts of information security occur. The emphasis for this paper is to explain the
information security concepts and relationships between them in order to alter our understanding of
why we protect information.
This proposed theory on information security simply states that the motivation behind all attempts by
an organisation to secure information against threats is to create resources that can later improve
organisational performance. Information will degrade over time without adequate controls
implemented for its protection. In terms of the taxonomy of information systems theories presented by
Gregor (2006), this manuscript provides a (Type 2) high-level theory for explanation, describing how
and why the phenomenon of information security occurs.
The theory on information security originates from the area of information systems, built entirely from
concepts that relate to information and the breadth of systems that it can reside on. It applies to
different levels, including strategies to protect information used by individuals, groups, organisations
and also protects information shared between organisations. The results are that, depending on the
information affected, degradation over time may reduce the usefulness of the resource and thus lead to
the potential erosion of competitive advantage or organisational success.
The paper proceeds in three major sections, with the major headings and sections structure adapted
from Rivard (2014). In the next section, we introduce information security, discuss why a theory on
information security is needed and carefully examine issues with existing theory. Secondly, we explain
the theory on information security. Thirdly, we examine the implications for the development of this
theory. Finally, we briefly draw conclusions, consider limitations and offer proposals for future
research to improve our theoretical understanding of information security.

2 WHAT IS INFORMATION SECURITY?
The following section begins with a narrative describing why a new theory on information security is
needed. This description of what motivates the study is based on an exploration of the theoretical
issues in relevant literature. The result is a set of conditions that this new theoretical development then
meets.

2.1 Motivating the Study
This paper is broadly motivated by calls for ‘good theory’ within the domain of information systems
(Webster and Watson 2002; Zmud 1998; Zmud et al. 2001). The current paucity of good quality
theories in the information systems domain leads to calls for development of our ‘own’ theory (Markus
and Saunders 2007; Weber 2003; Weber 2012). Importantly, there have been calls for bolder and
more original information systems explanatory theory (Grover et al. 2008). The development of new
ideas and theories is scarce yet essential (Markus and Saunders 2007; Rivard 2014). Therefore, to
begin with, as Weber (2003, pp. iii) states, “choosing the phenomena we wish to explain or predict—is
the most important decision we make as a researcher”.
More specifically, this paper is motivated by an apparent gap in the literature where a theory on
information security is not apparent. A search of the academic literature, as described in the next
section, does not reveal any literature that purports to offer a theory on information security. This
search of overlooked areas is a form of neglect-spotting (Sandberg and Alvesson 2011).
Stronger theory can be produced from linking theories of diverse types and academics have been urged
to consider combining other types of theory with their own (Gregor 2006). Towards that, using this
theory on information security as one that underpins a theoretical perspective on information security
strategy in organisations could prove useful (Horne et al. 2015).
There are theories that relate to information security. For example, the Theory of Information
Warfare presents a model of information warfare in terms of four main elements: information
resources, players, offensive operations, and defensive operations (Denning 1999). The Theory of
Protection Motivation predicts users’ intentions to protect themselves after receiving fear-arousing
recommendations (Rogers 1975). There are no theories however where the locus of knowledge is in
information security alone.
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This gap however is not because information security is uninteresting. Almost every organisation
requires information to function and disruption to information from a security breach can often lead
to disruption of an organisation’s operations (Cavusoglu et al. 2004). Therefore filling this gap will
make a valuable contribution to the body of knowledge.

2.2 Relevant Literature
A thematic study of the information systems literature is presented, in order to develop a perspective
on information security and its interactions. The contextual setting is described before information
security itself is examined. With this understanding, a theory on information security can then be
posited based on commonly-accepted philosophy.

2.2.1 Context
The theories or knowledge within any discipline are explained based on questions grouped within four
classes which, in descending order, are 1. domain, 2. ontology, 3. epistemology and 4. socio-political
(Gregor 2006). This section explores the information security concept within the context of these four
classes of questions.


Domain of Information Systems

Information systems has been defined as a collective term that refers to a number of areas of
application, including enterprise integration, natural language translation, geographic information
systems, legal information systems, and biological information systems (Guarino 1998). Separately, a
core set of phenomena that defines the information systems field has been defined as including
information technology (IT) capabilities, the IT artefact, IT practices, usage and impact (Benbasat and
Zmud 2003). At the broadest level, the domain of information systems has been defined and explained
as a system composed of people and computers that processes or interprets information, which is the
view adopted throughout the rest of this paper (D'Atri et al. 2008).


Ontological Approach

Theory is understood within information systems as being broad in nature, to encompass frameworks,
models, or the body of knowledge (Gregor 2006). The ontological character of theory types has been
articulated as having five categorisations: analysis, explanation, prediction, explanation and
prediction, and design and action (Gregor 2006). These categorisations provide researchers with a
language to describe the various components of theory.


Epistemological Approach

To explore how theory can be constructed and what research methods can be used, we note that
discussion in this area often contrasts the positivist and interpretivist views, or the quantitative and
qualitative views (Gregor 2006). As explained later in Section 3.2 - Theory Type, the type of theory
expounded in this paper is explanatory in nature, and theories of this nature are often associated with
research in the interpretivist paradigm (Gregor 2006).


Socio-political Approach

Exploring where theory has been developed to date, we find that there have been a surprisingly low
number of theories, (i.e. fewer than half a dozen) that, when developed, originated solely from the area
of information systems (Markus and Saunders 2007). Other theories have originating areas that
include both information systems and a reference discipline, whilst the remainder originate solely
from another discipline (Gregor 2006).
Information security is a phenomenon within the information systems domain because it involves
people protecting information that resides on computers, which are all common elements consistent
with information systems. From an information systems viewpoint, information security is concerned
with protecting information (Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen 2007).

2.2.2 Defining Information Security
This section documents the definition and goal for each of computer security, information security and
cyber security. Computer security, also known as information and communication technology (ICT)
security, is the security of the computers that process and store information (Von Solms and Van
Niekerk 2013). The goal of computer security is the confidentiality, integrity, availability, nonrepudiation, accountability, authenticity, and reliability of information resources (Von Solms and Van
Niekerk 2013).
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Information security used to be purely technical, however has evolved over time to keep pace with
changes to computers and networks (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). The goal of information
security involves preserving the confidentiality, integrity and availability of business information
(McCumber 1991; Posthumus and von Solms 2004). As well, the goal of information security is to
safeguard business continuity and reduce business impairment by constraining the effect of security
incidents (Von Solms 1998). In another contribution the goal of information security was stated to be
confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-repudiation of information (Siponen and OinasKukkonen 2007).
Cyber security is different to information security (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). Although they
are very different, the term cyber security seems to be used interchangeably with the term information
security in academic literature (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). Cyber security transcends the
boundaries of information security to include the defence of information and also people (Von Solms
and Van Niekerk 2013). The goal and general security objectives of cyber security are the availability,
integrity and confidentiality of an organisation’s assets including networks, infrastructure, information
and personnel (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013).
Examining the above discourse, we can see that there are three different definitions for computer
security, information security and cyber security but that their goals seem to be roughly similar, in that
they are internally-focussed and revolve around confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This
homogeneity of goals is incongruous given the disparity in definitions and the following section will
provide an improved goal for information security.

3 A THEORY ON INFORMATION SECURITY
A theory can be defined as “a statement of relations among concepts within a boundary set of
assumptions and constraints” (Bacharach 1989, pp. 496). We argue that information security needs
its own distinct goal, not just to copy the goal of computer security, and then deconstruct the proposed
theory on information security into its various elements. This section describes the conceptual
elements of the proposed theory, the relationships between the concepts, and proposed use of the
theory.

3.1 Theory Overview
Information security is a conscious or subconscious process in which people and organisations attempt
to create sustainably-viable resources, from information. They do so by applying suitable controls to
protect information from threats, according to the goals for the use of that information. This then
results in sustainable resources. Information security focusses on what protection is afforded to
information and what use that protected information can then offer organisations.

3.2 Theory Type
A taxonomy of theory types articulates five categorisations: analysis, explanation, prediction,
explanation and prediction, and design and action (Gregor 2006). This theory embodies the second
type: a theory which provides “an explanation of how, why, and when things happened” (Gregor
2006, pp. 619). To clarify, this paper does not describe and categorise themes within information
security, as this alone is not theory (Bacharach 1989; Rivard 2014). Rather, this paper distils complex
concepts in information security and then offers a new explanation of what the motivations behind it
are, using clear language.
Theories for explanation are described as an ideal type of theoretical contribution (Rivard 2014). Pure
theory papers with explanations of theoretical mechanisms are welcomed as essays with highly valued
characteristics (Markus and Saunders 2007). Other researchers have posited theories which are
explanatory in nature without testable propositions (Orlikowski and Robey 1991). The writing of a
paper where the end product is purely the advancement of a new theory via a detailed explanation is
perfectly acceptable (Walsham 1995).
Construct validity can be said to have been achieved when, amongst other principles, the interlocking
system of laws which constitute a theory (called a nomological network) are made clear, the theoretical
constructs are observable, and the constructs in the nomological net have been elaborated on
(Cronbach and Meehl 1955). It is understood that in the early history of a nomological net, as
described in this paper, the network will be limited and have few connections.
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3.3 Assumptions
Clarifying the assumptions of information security is important otherwise there is a risk of
inappropriate use of the construct. This would then adversely affect construct validity and potentially
the cumulative research tradition (Roberts et al. 2012).
Firstly, information security depends on a completed information classification assessment. This
identifies what information is owned by the organisation and therefore what information needs to be
protected. It also identifies what bits of information are more important than others. Without this
assessment of information that is required to be protected, there is no way of clearly identifying which
controls are most appropriate to deploy.
Secondly, an organisation’s information security depends on the security budget. If the security budget
is not large enough to procure the minimum number of controls necessary to protect the information
identified in the classification assessment, then the integrity of the information is threatened.
Finally, information security depends on an organisation’s ability to match controls with threats.
Inappropriate selection of controls can lead to either wasteful spending on unnecessary controls or
conversely, inadequate protection of information which threatens its ability to be sustainably used.

3.4 Structural Components
There are various taxonomies of theory structure with one example describing the parts as being
constructs, associations, states, events, and the whole theory as having importance, novelty,
parsimony, level and falsifiability (Weber 2012). The structure used in this paper however is based on
the “structural components of theory” (Gregor 2006, pp. 620). It includes means of representation,
the constructs which together form the nomological net, the relationships between the constructs and
the scope. Care is also taken to explain why some theory components were not applicable, such as
causal explanations, testable propositions and prescriptive statements.

3.4.1 Means of Representation
This theory on information security must be represented physically (Gregor 2006). Figure 1 below
shows the four constructs included in this theory on information security and the three relationships
between the constructs.

Figure 1: Schematic of Theory on Information Security
3.4.2 Constructs
The nomological network is comprised of four main constructs: information, controls, threats and
resources. The following section describes each in turn and ascribes meaning to each. Care is also
taken to identify whether the construct is observable, because a necessary condition for a construct to
be scientifically admissible is that it be part of a nomological net of observables (Cronbach and Meehl
1955). The reason for this is so that we can then apply the famous Verification Principle, which argues
that only statements which are provable by observation can convey factual information.

5

Australasian Conference on Information Systems
2016, Wollongong, Australia


Horne et al.
A Theory on Information Security

Information

Information is seen as amorphous and can be printed on paper, stored on computers, sent by post or
electronically, shown on videos and articulated in a discussion (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). As
well as being stored on physical media such as paper and digital media such as computers, information
can also reside on cognitive media, i.e. people’s minds (Ahmad et al. 2005). Information can also have
various levels of sensitivity, is difficult to control which sometimes results in leakage, and is intangible
in nature (Ahmad et al. 2005). Information however is not data, with the distinction being that data
are raw facts and information is processed data that is meaningful (McKinney Jr and Yoos 2010). It is
interesting to note that information hosted in the cloud brings its own set of challenges including (1)
long-term viability, where information restoration becomes doubtful should the cloud vendor become
bankrupt, and (2) information availability, where cloud vendors may not restore to a different
environment should the information become unavailable (Catteddu 2010).
Information has some attributes including sensitivity and level of analysis. Non-sensitive information
can be unclassified or if sensitive, classified as PROTECTED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP
SECRET. This classification is then used as a basis for allocating access rights to organisational staff
(Ahmad et al. 2014). Information is created and used at all levels of analysis within an organisation at
varying sensitivities and Table 1 below provides examples of each:
Level of Analysis

Non-sensitive Information

Sensitive Information

Individual

Desk phone number

Passwords

Group

Department name

Customer sales list

Organisational

Website URL

Trade secrets

Inter-organisational

Purchase order number

Sales contract pricing

Table 1. Examples of Organisational Information and Level of Analysis


Controls

Organisational security controls (or countermeasures) are defined as an appropriate mix of physical,
technical or operational security controls. The goal of controls is to mitigate the risks to information
(Posthumus and von Solms 2004). Controls are used to protect information by reducing the risk posed
by exposures or vulnerabilities arising from threats (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). A strong set of
protective controls can provide an organisation with an effective defence capability and an
organisation’s capabilities provide the best defence against the existing array of competitive forces
(Porter 1980).
Controls stipulated by standards are intended to prevent and detect attacks from threats, primarily
through the use of technical, formal, and informal controls. Technical controls are the computer-based
countermeasures. Formal controls are the policies, procedures, and rules that direct staff. Informal
controls refer to the development of a security culture and the provisioning of education, training and
awareness programs (Beebe and Rao 2010).


Threats

There are many threats to the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of organisational information
along with many countermeasures (Workman et al. 2008). Threats to information systems security
include unauthorised access, changing of information, and the destruction of protective infrastructure
that helps preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information (Workman et al.
2008). Various threats persistently target exposures or vulnerabilities and ultimately have a adverse
impact on information (Beebe and Rao 2010; Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013).


Resources

Resources have been defined as “inputs into the production process- they are the basic unit of
analysis. The individual resources of the firm include items of capital equipment, skills of employees,
patents, brand names, finance” (Grant 1991, pp. 118). Grant (1991) then continues that the
organisation should then inventory the available resources and assess them for value generation,
before developing a strategy to maximise the value from each one.
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A competing view on business strategy defines resources as comprising all assets, capabilities,
processes, information and knowledge (Barney 1991). Resources have also been defined as strengths
that the organisation can use to formulate and implement their strategies (Porter 1981).
Information resources are crucial to supporting organisational performance by providing prospects for
the establishment of competitive advantage and as such, preservation of information-based, intangible
resources is a significant imperative for organisations (Porter and Millar 1985; Teece 2000). For the
financial returns to an organisation to be sustainable, the resources that support them must also be
sustainable (Grant 1991). The longevity of the of an organisation’s competitive advantage also depends
on the speed at which its supporting resources degrade (Grant 1991).
A key point is that information already exists so it is disingenuous to suggest that protecting it creates
an entirely new entity. What does happen however is that by protecting information with controls, it
becomes a robust, ruggedised resource, resilient to threats. This resource can then be relied upon and
trusted by the organisation to not degrade over time and provide the same utility now as in 20 years.
To illustrate, imagine a pharmaceutical organisation that has, through a set of multi-year expensive
trials, successfully developed a new chemical formula for a proposed drug it wishes to take to market.
This chemical formula on its own is extremely vulnerable because if a competitor organisation can
steal it through industrial espionage and quickly bring it to market, then the investment has been
wasted. Once it has been protected with a patent however (which is a form of security control) then it
will serve as a source of competitive advantage for the organisation for the next 20 years. In this
example, the theory on information security in this paper would argue that the chemical formula is
information, the patent application process is a control and the completed patent is a resource.

3.4.3 Statements of Relationship
This section describes the relationships between constructs which can be variously described as
associative, compositional, directional or causal (Gregor 2006). The nature of the theory described in
this paper means that the relationships are described succinctly but clearly and carefully.


R1 – Relationship between Information and Resources

Information has been conceptualised as amorphous and intangible, with varying degrees of sensitivity,
various storage platforms and varying levels of analysis. Resources have been conceptualised as
information-based, sustainable, traceable, durable and able to be assessed for potential use in driving
competitive advantage. When information is converted into a resource, there are many inferences for
the final form that it takes and the following is a discussion of them.
The cause of information being converted into resources is the application of protective controls.
When these controls are applied, the resulting resources cease to be amorphous and intangible
because they can now be recorded in an asset tracking register. The storage platform may also change
due to access restrictions placed on the new resource. Two attributes will remain consistent however,
which are sensitivity and level of analysis. The only potential changes may be that sensitivity is
upgraded once maximum value is assessed and level of analysis may change once the resource is made
available for use throughout the organisation. The creation of a robust resource through the
application of security controls to information is consistent with the definitions of a resource being
sustainable and durable.


R2 – Relationship between Controls and Information

Controls positively cause information to be protected. Controls have been defined as being formal,
informal or technical and all three forms can be applied to information that resides on physical, digital
and cognitive media. For example, with information that resides on physical media such as paper, a
formal control might be take the form of message handling procedures that dictate how the page is to
be marked with a classification indicating the sensitivity of the information and also dissemination
limiting markers. An informal control might include training on how to mark the paper accordingly. A
technical control might be a filing cabinet that the paper can be stored in.


R3 – Relationship between Threats and Information

Threats negatively cause information to become degraded. Threats intend to degrade the integrity,
confidentiality and availability of information, with some threats being known and some unknown.
Threats are persistent (Baskerville 2005). The implication of this is that information will always be
degraded over time if there are no controls. Even if there are protective security controls, if we accept
that some threats are unknown (i.e. dynamic, unique, targeted, customised), then the controls won’t
defend effectively against some threats and information will be degraded.

7

Australasian Conference on Information Systems
2016, Wollongong, Australia

Horne et al.
A Theory on Information Security

3.4.4 Scope
Abstracting ideas to a higher level and generalising about a phenomenon, its interactions and the
degree of causality are at the heart of theory development (Gregor 2006). The scope of a theory is
described by the generalisability of the construct relationships using modal qualifiers (for example
some or all) and explanations about boundaries (Gregor 2006).
In this theory on information security, a statement on the modal qualifiers used to describe the
relationship between controls and threats is: Some information is protected by some controls to
produce all resources. An implication of this statement is that if information has not been protected by
a control, then it cannot be considered a resource. Another is that all information to be used for
organisational purposes is to be protected. Also, this theory forbids the use of unprotected information
in organisations. The reason that the qualifier all was not used with information or controls is that
there is no way of determining whether this theory holds true for all information and controls since the
authors do not have access to all information and controls to make an assessment.
The boundaries of this theory on information security include that it specifically applies to the
protection of information and not to the protection of the infrastructure, networks or platforms that
information resides on. Protection of infrastructure, networks and platforms is better known as
computer security, communications security or cyber security (Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen 2007).
This theory is not bounded by levels of analysis as the use of this theory to explain why organisations
protect information applies equally at the individual, group, organisational and inter-organisational
levels, i.e. resources are created and used at all four levels.

3.4.5 Theory Components Not Present
There are three structural elements to this theory on information security that are not present, given
this type of theory is explanatory not predictive. They are a definitive causal explanation, testable
propositions and prescriptive statements, which are explained more fully in the following sections.


Causal Explanations

This theory on information security states that the application of controls causes the conversion of
information into resources. However, can this be said to be always true? There are four different types
of causal analysis (Gregor 2006):
i.

Regularity (or nomological) analysis, i.e. ‘A causes B’;

ii.

Counterfactual analysis, i.e. ‘If not A, then not B’;

iii.

Probabilistic causal analysis, i.e. ‘A increases the likelihood of B’;

iv.

Manipulation or teleological causal analysis, i.e. ‘If A, then B’;

In this paper, the terms explanation or causal explanation refer to the third type of causal analysis,
being the probabilistic causal analysis type. In other words, the application of controls increases the
likelihood of information being converted into resources. The reason is that this probabilistic type of
causality is more suited to social sciences, and in this case, an infinite number of people are interacting
with an infinite number of controls protecting an infinite amount of information, which means we lack
a closed system where all the variables can be identified (Gregor 2006). If we lack the ability to identify
all the variables, then we cannot claim to be partaking in regularity analysis.
Probabilistic reasoning alone however, is not enough to provide definitive statements of relationships
amongst phenomena, which is why this theory component is said to be not present (Gregor 2006).


Testable propositions or hypotheses

The hallmark of scientific theory is that universal statements can be made about constructs and their
relationships that are falsifiable (i.e. testable) (Gregor 2006). Theories for prediction provide testable
propositions that can be evaluated empirically (Gregor 2006). Explanatory theories however do not
provide any testable propositions (Gregor 2006). This explanatory theory on information security
should therefore not be applied deterministically.


Prescriptive Statements

Prescriptive statements are the steps in a list that, when followed, lead to the creation of an artefact
(Gregor 2006). This theory on information security does not provide any prescriptive statements
about the manner in which controls should be applied to information in order to protect it and create
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resources. Therefore, prescriptive statements are said to not be part of this explanatory theory on
information security.

4 IMPLICATIONS OF THEORY ON INFORMATION SECURITY
This section advances the various implications of the research model and these are separated into both
research and practice areas (Zmud 1998). Some of these implications inform the suggested future
research directions in Section 5 Conclusion.

4.1 Theoretical
Implications for theoretical research include the possible linking of this theory on information security
with the theory on internal analysis, which considers the use of resources to be fundamental to the
creation and protection of competitive advantage. This highlights the potential for supporting the
further developmental work being conducted on understanding information security strategy. For
example, resources are combined to produce capabilities, which then form the main basis for an
organisation’s competitive advantage subject to certain criteria (Grant 1991; Porter 1980).
Alternatively, as described in Section 2.1 - Motivating the Study, this theory on information security
could form the basis of a theoretical perspective on information security strategy in organisations. The
theory could explain the motivation behind efforts to protect strategic information at the
organisational and inter-organisational levels. Research into information security strategy forms an
emerging field that requires a theoretical base.

4.2 Practical
Implications for practice include ideas for the situational contexts where information security would
be most applicable (Zmud 1998). Practical ways that this theory on information security can make an
impact include indicating the need for better identification and management of resource and controls.

5 CONCLUSION
The study advances knowledge in the information security field by creating a new understanding of
what information security is and the motivations behind it. The following section recaps the
contribution made in this paper, identifies the limitations constraining research into information
security and offers suggestions for future research directions.

5.1 Contribution
This section provides a strong rationalisation for why the conceptualisations developed in this article
have advanced our collective understanding of the information security phenomenon.
Based on our review, no theory on information security was apparent in the literature and this paper
now offers one. This theory on information security states that the goal focussing all attempts by an
organisation to secure information against threats is to create resources that can then later be used for
organisational performance. The confidentiality, integrity and availability of information is the goal of
controls not information security.

5.2 Limitations of Research into Information Security
The theory on information security is of help to academics looking to explain the theoretical base for
conceptual models and frameworks that involve information security. We have described firstly, what
type of theory it is and secondly, its structural components including individual construct elements
and the relationships between them. However, we still have limitations on our perception of
information security theory and this section describes them.
Firstly, information security has been conceptualised in various forms, including as a process (Von
Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). It has also been variously been described as a capability and a
framework (Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen 2007). This raises concerns around construct validity issues
as adhering to one conceptualisation risks marginalising another.
Secondly, this information security theory can be applied at various levels, as stated previously in
Section 3.4.4 - Scope. However, this does not take into account communication required between the
number of people who may have to cooperate at group level as opposed to individual level, for
instance. At inter-organisational level, there are differences between the way that organisations
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collaborate as opposed to the way that a staff group would collaborate. As a result, the nomological net
for each of the levels will be different.
Thirdly, there does not seem to be a way to measure when information has been protected enough by
controls and can therefore be deemed a resource. If this knowledge could be developed, ‘minimumviable resource’ criteria could be developed.

5.3 Future Research Directions
Information security theory has fecundity and raises new opportunities for information systems
scholars to develop the body of knowledge that currently exists on information security. The authors
hope this paper raises more questions than can be answered and provides the impetus for further
research to be conducted. The answers to some of these questions will also have contributions towards
practice. The following are three suggested research directions for information security theory
development, with these directions being adapted from Zmud (1998).
Firstly, the theory presented in this paper can be refuted by developing alternative new theories on
information security. Hopefully different plausible theories supported by disparate groups of
researchers will arise and stimulate intellectual debate on the nature of information security.
Secondly, existing theories from reference disciplines can be applied to information security. From
sociology, how could Conflict Theory, which focuses on competition (threats?) to resources
(information?) and the inherent iniquity afforded some units (organisations?) in society, be adapted to
information security? From economics, how could the Pareto Principle Theory (the 80/20 rule) be
adapted to the application of expensive controls in information security?
Thirdly, improvements to the theory described in this manuscript and its use can be further developed.
For example, additional theorising of this theory could result in a deeper understanding of the
relationship between threats and controls. Do they have a bi-directional relationship? Could the use of
particular controls dictate the threats that present themselves, both internal and external? Could the
relationship between the constructs within this theory be reduced to a scientific law through the
development of a mathematical statement such as I x (C/T) = R? How could this paper provide the
theoretical base for conceptual models or frameworks of information security-related topics?
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